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   As a building stone in the development economics, it is unique that Rosenstein-Rodan’ 
paper focus on the special problem of developing ones. Obedience to the style, this paper 
teases the economic growth theory based on leading ones and the economic development 
theory based on following ones and asserts that the former doesn’t suit to the later according 
to the “big divergence” of economic performance between developed ones and developing 
ones in history. Therefore, the unique economic nature in the developing ones needs the 
distinct theory and policy. However, The structuralist school, the first generation of 
development economists, and the second generation of development economists 
(neo-liberalism or Washington Consensus) could not explain and guide successfully the 
economic development around the developing world and China. Recently, the new 
development thinking has been inspired by rethinking the major premise constituting the 
foudantion of development theory by some development economists. 
   It is wind vane that the research plan proposed by chief economist of the World Bank 
where is the arena of development theory research and policy design. Justin Yifu Lin, the 
Pro-Chief Economist (2008-2012) of the World Bank, who is the first chief economist from 
developing countries, has suggested a general framework (New Structural Economics) to 
integrate the old structural economics and neo-liberalism economics into a unified 
framework.The central insight of structuralism is that developing countries are qualitatively 
different from developed ones. Justin Lin wants to make structuralist economics respectable 
again, and many researchers and policymakers applaud him for that. He wants to marry 
structuralism with neoclassical economic reasoning, and they applaud this idea too. However, 
there are the debates and controversies raised by recent discussion on New Structural 
Economics by Lin, especially on its methodology of comparative advantage analysis, 
dynamic nature, and institutional condition. On this basis, in order to expand the binary 
paradigm that development strategy conform or defy the comparative advantage depond on 

















This framework constituted by three parts embedded in a logic link as follows: the 
dilemma, dynamic adjustment, and institutional condition of development strategy. It is 
development policy must be trade-off due to the unique economic nature in developing ones 
that the dilemma of development strategy whose core lies in the costs and benfits of 
development policy determined by the interactive mechanism between market and 
government, which resolves the rational decision problem of development strategy. The basic 
logic of the dilemma as follows: firstly, market is a incentive mechanism which contains 
product price, factor cost and profits to incenctive the rational agents; secondly, the essence 
of development is continuous structure upgrading; thirdly, the market agents by emphasizing 
information, coordination, externalities, rigidities, etc., may be failure in structure upgrading 
in a degree; fourthly, in order to promote agents to grasp development opportunity to upgrade 
economic structure, government has motivation to implement supportive policies which 
soften the market discipline through intervention in the output price, input cost or profit, at 
same time, build channels of distortion to induce economic disparity. The dynamic 
adjustment of development strategy is about the compare statics analsis to resolve the 
dynamic optimization of development strategy. The basic logic of the dilemma as follows: 
when the development level and endowment have been improved by development strategy, 
the marginal benefit of development strategy would go down while the marginal costs go up; 
therefor, the optimal development strategy must be downward adjusted, where the degree of 
deviation form the present development stage and intervention in market should be minished. 
We should note that the dynamic adjustment of development strategy is endogenously 
determined by itself. The institutional condition of development strategy maily refer to the 
motivation of government who is the descision maker and implementer of development 
strategy. The basic logic of the institutional condition as follows: when the incentive is 
compatible between the agent of government and the agent of market, the government would 
optimally adjust the development strategy according to development level with the capacity 
constraints. Otherwise, it is very difficult to adjust efficient development strategy. When, the 
adjustment track of development strategy depends on the changes of distribution of property 
right which is the allocation of decision-making power of development strategy between 
















development strategy constitutes of the trade-off of development policy between structure 
upgrading and structure disparity with the capacity constraints and institution constraints.  
In order to proof the trade-off of development strategy between structure upgrading and 
structure disparity, based on China’s economy, we deconstruct the development strategy into 
development policies mix and policy feature (policy heterogeneity that is different from 
market heterogeneity), and choose two sets important economic phenomenon as analytic 
target from a micro and a macro perspective. The first sets phenomenon of over-investment 
(excess capacity) and technical progress, investment wave and development opportunities, 
are used to reveal the dilemma of the specific development policies, such as financial policy, 
competition policy, fiscal taxation policy, etc., and those mix, on taking advantage of the 
predictable development opportunities offered by late-mover advantage only existing in 
developing ones. Firstly,, the market itself cannot try its best to achieve the predictable 
opportunities due to be timid and overcautious when the rational market agent anticipates that 
defective risk is induced by invest wave and excess capacity as result of market coordination 
failure. Secondly, in order to stimulate agents to make most of the predictable opportunities, 
the government would intervene in the market with supportive policies to insure that price 
will not be downer or costs higher after agents having invested into the opportunities. Lastly, 
via relaxing the market discipline, the development strategy stimulates agents to utilize the 
development opportunities, at the same time, builds the passageway of the serious invest 
wave and excess capacity. 
The second sets phenomenon of gross growth and sector disparity, income and group 
inequity, are used to reveal the dilemma of the sector-specific or group-specific policies  
which is the key feature of development strategy in China. In general, this paper finds that the 
gross growth accompanying with sector disparity is “Achilles’heel” of government-leading 
economy development: in oder to maximizing the rate of gross growth, government would 
implement (industry, region, urban and rural, etc.) sector-specific policies, as result, which 
could induce the sector disparity. The empirical analysis of dual economy and region 
economy during about sixty years in China support the mechanism of disparity for growth by 
government. Similarly, in order to improve gross income level, government would implement 
















theory based on the developed ones which highlights the role of market (heterogenity) in the 
distributin of income, this paper highlights the importment role of government (heterogenity) 
in shapping the path of income distribution in developing ones. 
   Besides, because of the private benefits of government agents may be decreased by 
minishing the degree of government intervention, the incentive is incompatible between 
government and market, as result, the optimal dynamic adjustment of development strategy 
will not come true. When, as what mentioned before, the adjustment track depends on the 
changes of distribution of property right which is the allocation of decision-making power of 
development strategy between government and market. Taking a perspective of layered 
institution based on New Institution Economics, this paper analyze the influence of culture 
evolution on property right changes as the culture background of development strategy. In 
consideration of which culture is also a lack of precision and operability in economics, we 
operate the culture based on the habit and characteristics of populace who play game with 
government. Basis of the property right game, we parameterize the habit and characteristics 
of populace. Those parameters are also estimated by China’s data during last a cycle of sixty 
years. Then, those parameters are used to simulate the distribution, direction and elasticity of 
property rights changes.  
Lastly, in consideration of the completeness of theortical perspective, different to the 
Schumpeterian (or the Kuznetsian) development, this paper goes back to the Smithian 
development, which is that the structure changes (upgrading) is regarded as the division of 
labor to be deepened. Therefore, via the transformation of angle, we grasp the human capital 
heterogeneity among the peasant, rural migrant worker, perpetual rural-urban immigrant, 
blue-collar worker and white-colar worker embed in the chain of division of labor, and 
analyse the influence of structure upgrading of urban sector on the wage and employment of 
each different group in dual economy, and then disassemble the growth potential and 
inequality tendency. It is not optimistic that the picture shows in the dual economy in China. 
At the sanme time, we also explain the changes of census register (HuKou) institution in 
China.  
   Although there are lots of cockamamie literature, framework design, experience summary, 
















the China’s economy to form heuristic thought. It is the innovation which is only admitted by 
myself that an analysis framework of the costs and benefits of development strategy is built 
by integrateing old structuralism (the first generation developmet economics) which highlight 
the benefits of development strategy and neo-liberalism (the second generation development 
economics) which highlight the costs of development strategy based on the binary paradigm 
that development strategy conform or defy the comparative advantage depond on the 
endowment of New Structural Economics by Lin. The premise of this framework is the 
unique national condition. The issue of this framework is the structure changes (structure 
upgrading and structure disparity). The core of this framework is the interaction between 
market and government with capacity consrains and institution constrains. Besides, via 
analysis of the two sets important economic phenomenon in China, based two dimensions of 
the policies mix and policy feature, it is also important innovation to proof the trade-off of 
development strategy between structure upgrading and structure disparity. It is worth 
mentioning that this paper highlights the importance of properity rights in the dynamic 
adjustment of the development strategy when the incentive is incompatible between 
government and market in the development progress, and reveal the mechanism of the impact 
of the culture habit and characteristics of populace on the property rights changes as the 
culture backgroud of the development strategy. It is also worth mentioning that this paper 
analyize the impact of the structure changes (upgrading) is regarded as the division of labor 
to be deepened on the transformation of dual economy by translating the Schumpeterian (or 
the Kuznetsian) development to the Smithian development. 
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